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Of the heady early days of the French Revolu-
tion, Wordsworth wrote: "Bliss it was in that dawn 
to be alive. But to be young was very heaven." 
Those of us interested in the intersection of tax law 
and administrative law may be excused if we feel 
similar exhilaration about the time in which we live. 
In terms of the intersection, this is the most 
exciting moment in the tax history of the United 
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tax nt1tes~' 
States. Recent cases have tested - and cases still in 
progress continue to test - the validity olf several 
Treasury regulations: 
1. On January 11 the Supreme Court decided 
Mayo, the culmination of controversy over the 
validity of a regulation dealing with employ-
ment taxes for medical residents and other 
student-employees. 1 
2. Section 6015 prescribes a two-year limita-
tions period for claims for spousal relief under 
section 6015(b) and (c), but it is silent as to a 
limitation period for claims for spousal relief 
under section 6015(£). By regulation, Treasury 
established a two-year limitations period for 
section 6015(f).2 The Tax Court has repeatedly 
held that regulatory provision invalid. Thus 
far, the Tax Court has been reversed on this 
issue by the Third Circuit3 and the Se~venth 
Circuit,4 and the Sixth Circuit is expected to 
weigh in soon.s 
3. Section 6501(e) creates a six-year limitations 
period for income tax assessments w.hen a 
return omits income exceeding 25 perc.ent of 
reported income. The IRS maintains that this 
extended period also applies when overstate-
ments of basis lead to the requisite understate-
ment of income. Treasury promulgated a 
1 Mayo Fo1111dation for Medical EJ11catiot1 & Rrseurclr v. U11ited 
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (Jan. 11, 2011), Doc 2011-609, 2011! TNT 8-10. 
For discussion of Mayo, see Irving Salem, "Ma.Vo Dissected: 
Some Dragons Slain, Some Still Breathing Fire," Tux Notes, Mar. 
14, 2011 , p. 1327, Doc 2011-4255, 2011 TNT 50-5. 
2Reg. section 1.6015-S(b)(l). 
:1Man11el/a v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 196 (2009), Doc· 2009-8425, 
21109 TNT 69-21, rev'd, 631 F.Jd 115 (3d Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-1183, 
2011 TNT 13-10. 
4 L.antz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), Doc 2009-7979, 
2009 TNT 65-8, rev'd, &,.)7 F.Jd 379 (7th Cir. 2010), Doc WJ0-12604, 
2010 TNT 110-17. For discussion of this case, s~ Bryain T. Camp, 
" Interpreting Statutory Silence," Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 501. 
Doc 2010-13289, or 2010 TNT 148-6 (arguing that thE! Tax Court 
was right in Lantz and the Seventh Circuit was wnmg). 
!>Hall v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 19 (Sept. 22, 2010), Doi.· 
2010-207.U , 2010 TNT 184-11, on appeal, No. 10-2628 (6th Cir.); 
Buckt1er v. Commissioner, No. 12153-09 (T.C. 2010) (unreported 
order), 011 appeal, No. 10-2056 (6th Cir.). Hall is in the briefing 
stage. Brickner has been fully briefed and is awaiting oral 
argument. 
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temporary regulation, now replaced by a per-
manent regulation, enshrining the IRS's inter-
pretation.6 The temporary regulation was 
invalidated by the Tax Court, whose decision 
is now on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, with oral 
argument scheduled for April 5.7 Four other 
circuit courts have already weighed in on the 
issue. On January 26 the Seventh Circuit held 
for the IRS on the issue (although it did so as 
a matter of statutory construction, with only 
dicta as to the validity of the regulation).8 On 
February 7 and February 9 the Fourth Circuit 
and the Fifth Circuit, respectively, held against 
the IRS, refusing to accord Chevron deference 
because the section was seen as unambigu-
ous.9 On March 11 the Federal Circuit held for 
the IRS, according the regulation deference 
under Chevron. 10 The issue remains pending in 
the Tenth Circuit.11 
4. The section 263 Uniform Capitalization re-
gime is implemented in part by a regulation 
setting forth the so called "associated-
property" rule. 12 In a case of first impression, 
the Court of Federal Claims considered the 
validity of the regulation. The court found 
discrepancies in the regulation and saw it as 
stretching the boundaries of reasonableness. 
Nonetheless, on February 25, the court reluc-
tantly upheld the regulation. D 
This report is about Mayo. As a Supreme Court 
decision, it is the most authoritative of the recent 
cases, and it has been cited in arguments in other 
recent cases challenging tax regulations. When rel-
evant, this report also addresses these other cases.14 
6 Reg. section 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(l)(iii), Tl71/aced by T.D. 9511, 
Doc 2010-26662, 2010 TNT 240-11, accompanying reg. sections 
301.6229(c)(2)-1 and 301.6501 (e)-1. 
7Intermo11ntai11 Insurance Seroices of Vail LLC v. Commissioner, 
134 T.C. 211 (2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT 88-12. 
8Beard v. Commissioner, 2011 WL 222249 (7th Cir. Jan. 26, 
2011), Doc 2011-1764, 2011 TNT 18-10. The taxpayer has asked 
the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Beard en bane. 
9 Home Co11crell' & Supply LLC v. United States, 107 AFTR2d 
2011-767 (4th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-2674, 2011 TNT 26-7; Burks v. 
Commissioner, 107 AFTR2d 2011-824 (5th Cir. 2011). 
10Grapevine Imports Lid. v. United States, 2011 WL 832915 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-52.U, 2011 TNT 49-14. 
11 Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, No. 09-9015 (10th Cir.), 
Doc 2010-14410, 2010 TNT 125-18. 
12Reg. section 1.263A-11 (e)(l )(ii)(B). 
13Dominion Resources Inc. v. United States, 107 AFTR2d 2011-
1033 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2011), Doc 2011-4145, 2011TNT40-11. 
14The cases are not just doctrinally significant. They also 
have significant revenue implications for taxpayers and the 
federal fisc. The government estimates that Social Security taxes 
on medical residents can be as much as $700 million per year 
and that had it lost Mayo, it would have had to pay out more 
than $1 billion in refunds of overpayments. Set•, e.x. 1 Inside 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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Mayo is a helpful case in that it clarifies the 
analytical process to be used when taxpayers chal-
lenge the validity of Treasury regulations. In gen- In. 
eral, Mayo confirms directions in which the ~ 
administrative rules of tax have been moving, and it 
clears out much of the accreted debris of outdated 
thinking. 
Part I describes the facts of Mayo and the Su-
preme Court's decision. Part II explains the ways in 
which Mayo clarifies the law governing challenges 
to the validity of tax regulations. Part III seeks to 
allay the fear that Mayo fundamentally shifts the 
balance in a pro-government direction in cases in 
which Treasury regulations are challenged. Finally, 
Part IV discusses some likely post-Mayo battle-
grounds. 
I. Mayo Facts and Decision 
Under FICA, both employers and employees are 
subject to tax, based on wages.15 Excluded from 
taxation, however, are amounts paid for "service 
performed in the employ of ... a school, college, or 
university . . . if such service is performed by a 
student who is enrolled and regularly attending 
classes at such school, college, or university."16 
The Mayo Foundation and the University of Min-
nesota offer residency programs that train doctors. 
The programs are multiyear and emphasize 
hands-on experience. Residents often spend 50 to 80 A), 
hours a week examining patients, making diag- '-'" 
noses, prescribing medication, recommending plans 
of care, and performing procedures. Residents are 
supervised. They are paid between $41,000 and 
$56,000 annually and are provided medical insur-
ance, malpractice insurance, and paid vacation time. 
In addition to learning through service, Mayo 
residents participate in structured education. They 
are assigned material to read, attend lectures and 
conferences, and take examinations. 
The issue in Mayo was whether medical residents 
fit within the FICA exception for students. Treasury 
regulations promulgated in 1951 provide ~hat the 
exception applies to students who work for their 
schools "as an incident to and for the purpose of 
pursuing a course of study."17 Until 2005, the "in-
cident to" determination was made case by case. 1H 
Higher Ed, "Medical Residents Ruled Employees," ai1ailable al 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/12/supreme_ 
court_says_medical_residents_not_students_for_tax_purposes 
Oan. 12, 2011). 
15sections 3101(a) (FICA tax on employees) and 3111(a) 
(FICA tax on employers). 
u'Section 3121(b)(10). l 
17Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d). 
18£.8., Rev. Rut. 78-17, 1978-1 C.B. 307. 
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In late December 2004, Treasury amended the 
regulation to provide that the exception applies 
only when the educational aspect predominates 
over the service aspect.19 The amended regulation 
categorically provides that services as a full-time 
employee (including scheduled work of more than 
40 hours a week) are not within the exception.20 
The Mayo Foundation and the University of 
Minnesota challenged the validity of the amended 
regulation. The district court agreed with the tax-
payers,21 in part because of its reading of the 
Supreme Court's pre-Chevron, tax-specific National 
Muffler decision.22 The circuit court reversed, con-
cluding that the nontax Chevron decision23 provided 
the governing standard and that, under Chevron, the 
amended regulation was valid.24 
In an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 
the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the cir-
cuit court. The Court held that (1) Chevron, not 
National Muffler, controls25; (2) section 3121(b)(10) is 
silent or ambiguous as to the definition of the 
student exception26; and (3) the amended regulation 
reasonably interprets section 312l(b)(10).27 
II. What Mayo Does 
Taxpayers have been challenging the validity of 
tax regulations for nearly as long as there have been 
tax regulations.2s As a result, many cases specific to 
tax existed before Chevron was decided.29 The pre-
Chevron cases had uncertainties; Chevron itself (as 
modified by subsequent cases) has been far from a 
model of clarity30; and the relationship of the two 
lines of authority was unsettled. The intersection of 
these three sets of ambiguities created a doctrinal 
mess, for which the Supreme Court itself bore a 
considerable share of the blame.31 For example, in 
post-Chevron tax cases, the Court sometimes cited 
19Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i). 
20Reg. section 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii). 
21 503 F. Supp.2d 1164 (D. Minn. 2007), Doc 2007-18316, 2007 
TNT 153-7. 
22National Muffler Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 
472 p979). 
:z: Cht.>vron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
24568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13439, 2009 TNT 
112-75. 
25Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-714. 
26Id. at 711. 
27ld. at 716. 
28E.g., Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938). 
29See cases cited in notes 69-75 infra. 
30See, e.g., Coeur Alaska Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation 
Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479 n.• (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citing cases applying Chevron but reaching inconsistent results). 
31The Court significantly modified Chevron in United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Justice Scalia describes Mead as 
an "inscrutable opinion ... whose incomprehensible criteria for 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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National Muffler and other times cited Chevron with-
out explanation of why one case and not the other 
was being cited.32 
Mayo improves the situation. Five aspects of the 
case are noteworthy. 
First, it was generally agreed long before Mayo 
that Chevron provides the standard when a taxpayer 
challenges a specific authority regulation issued 
under a delegation in some section other than 
section 780S(a).33 However, courts34 and comrnen-
tators35 disagreed about whether Chevron also gov-
erned challenges to the validity of regulations 
promulgated under section 7805(a)'s general del-
egation to Treasury of authority to "prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" 
of the code. 
That debate is now over. Mayo makes it clear that 
Chevron provides the controlling standard for gen-
eral authority regulations too,36 particularly when 
the regulation has gone through the notice and 
comment procedures of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA),37 as the regulation at issue in 
Mayo had. 
Second, Mayo undercuts the distinction that tra-
ditionally has been drawn between specific author-
ity and general authority regulations. Some courts 
- including the Supreme Court - and some com-
mentators used to say that general authority regu-
lations receive less deference than specific authority 
Chevron deference have produced so much confusion in the 
lower courts." Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479-2480 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
J2Compare United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 
U.S. 200, 219 (2001), and Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 
499 U.S. 554, 560-561 (1991) (both citing National Muffler) with 
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 
(1998), and United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) 
(both citing Chevron). 
JJE.g., Carlos v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004), Doc 
2004-18624, 2004 TNT 183-9; Square D Co. v. Commissioner, 118 
T.C. 299, 307 (2002), Doc 2002-7591, 2002 TNT 60-8, ajfd, 438 F.3d 
739 J7th Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-2877, 2006 TNT 30-9. 
· E.g., Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96 
(2006), Doc 2006-1541, 2006 TNT 18-10 (applying National Muf-
fler), rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), Doc 2008-3372, 2008 TNT 
33-41 (applying C/tevron). 
:\!>Compare John F. Coverdale, "Court Review of Tax Regula-
tions and Revenue Rulings in the Cl1evron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 35 (1995) (arguing that Chevron should not apply to 
Treasury regulations) to Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows as It Might 
Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 28, 
2006, p. 773, Doc 2006-14217, or 2006TNT167-105 (arguing that 
Cl1evron should apply to general authority tax regulations). 
:it•Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714. 
J75 U.S.C. section 553. 
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regulations.38 Others doubted the usefulness or the 
validity of that incantation.39 
Previous cases had wounded the traditional dis-
tinction. 40 Mayo deals it a mortal blow. The Court 
noted that "the administrative landscape has 
changed significantly" since the old cases expressing 
the traditional view,41 and it remarked: "Our inquiry 
[as to deference] does not turn on whether Con-
gress's delegation of authority was general or spe-
cific."42 
Third, Mayo continues the debate about interpre-
tive method at Chevron's step one. What sources 
may a judge legitimately consult in ascertaining 
whether the statute is ambiguous? The answer 
depends on which judge is writing the opinion. 
When a textualist judge does so, as Justice Clarence 
Thomas did in Brand X, the focus will be limited to 
the language and structure of the statute (perhaps 
with a constructional canon or two).4.1 When a 
purposivist judge writes the opinion, as Justice John 
Paul Stevens did in Chevron itself, a wider angle of 
vision will be used,44 including legislative history 
and other indicators of congressional intent.45 
Chief Justice Roberts is a textualist, so unsurpris-
ingly the step one analysis in Mayo is constrained in 
scope, with principal attention paid to the language 
of the statute.46 Although this is interesting, it could 
hardly be called profoundly significant. The next 
time a purposivist judge writes a step one opinion, 
he is unlikely to feel constrained by Chief Justice 
Roberts's approach. 
Fourth, Mayo's approach to the step two inquiry 
also is interesting. What are the criteria by which one 
decides whether the agency's interpretation is rea-
sonable? It might be argued that the only acceptable 
measures of reasonableness are those that bear on 
38E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 
(1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981). 
39£.g., Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Income Taxation of Indi-
viduals 46-5 (2002); Johnson, s11pra note 35, at 780-781. 
40£.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003), Doc 
2003-5648, 2003 TN1' 43-7 (noting that although the tax regula-
tion at issue was general authority in nature, "we must still treat 
the regulation with deference"). 
41 Ma110, 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
421d. at 113-114. 
43National Cable & Telecomn11micalicms Ass'n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, 545 U.S. 967, 989 (2005) (conducting the step one 
inquiry by reference to the statute's "plain terms''). 
44Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (referring to use of "traditional 
tools of statutory construction" to ascertain the "intention" of 
Con~ress). 
4
• For an illustration of the clash, compare Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Regions Hospital v. Shala/a, 
522 U.S. 448 (1998), witll Justice Scalia's dissent in that case. 
46Set• Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711. 
1550 
accuracy of meaning.47 For example, the relevant 
ambiguity in Mayo involves the definition of student 
under section 3121(b)(10). It could be maintained 
that only indicia bearing on the characteristics of 
students versus the characteristics of employees 
should be taken into account. 
Mayo, however, was not so limited. One consid-
eration that led the Court to conclude that the 
amended regulation is reasonable is that compared 
with a facts and circumstances inquiry, a categorical 
approach improves administrability, avoiding "the 
wasteful litigation and continuing uncertainty that 
would inevitably accompany any purely case-by-
case approach."48 
Administrability, of course, is a process value, 
not an accuracy indicator. Indeed, inherent in ad-
ministrability as an operative value is that some loss 
of classificatory precision is acceptable to enhance 
predictability, preserve resources, and the like.49 
Thus, the teaching of Mayo is that the step two 
reasonableness inquiry is not limited to accuracy-
of-meaning considerations but includes process val-
ues as well. so 
Finally, the ever-growing complexity of Ameri-
can law requires professionals to specialize. That 
survival necessity imposes costs, however: a tend-
ency to tunnel vision and ignorance or rejection of 
currents moving the broader law. Tax exceptional-
ism (carving tax out of rules of general application 
47See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
411-412 (1971) (emphasizing that the reasons for agency choices 
should relate to the considerations and purposes Congress 
made relevant to the statute at hand). 
48Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 715 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 
U.S. 299, 302 (1967)); see also Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (identifying predictability and ,reduced 
litigation as goals Chevron should promote); Lantz, 607 F.3d at 
485. 
4
•>see, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, "Assessing the Income Tax: 
Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness," 25 Oliio N.U. L. Rev. 101 
(1999); Steve R. Johnson, "The E.L. Wiegand Lecture: 
Administrability-Based Tax Simplification," 4 Nev. L./. 573, 
582-584 (2£Xl4). 
511Arguably, however, administrability is a consideration 
Congress intends to be relevant to every statute. Thus, even 
when the statutes in question require an agency to make 
individualized determinations (as, for example, section 6015(f) 
does), courts have allowed agencies to adopt bright-line rules to 
resolve classes of issues that arise frequently in the individual 
cases. E.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 243-244 (2001) (prison 
punishment case); American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 
612 (1991) (collective bargaining case); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 ( 
U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (disability benefits case). 
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without the warrant of compelling contextual dif-
ferences) and tax myopia are understandable but 
ultimately undesirable, as 151 and others have ar-
gued. 52 
Mayo is powerful ammunition against tax excep-
tionalism. In concluding that the law had evolved 
past National Muffler and the traditional "general 
authority versus spe~ific authority" cases, Mayo 
cited five cases - all' of them nontax cases.53 This 
pattern of citation dispels the idea that tax is an 
island untouched by the waves lapping on other 
administrative shores. Indeed, Mayo made the point 
explicitly. It stated: 
Mayo has not advanced any justification for 
applying a less deferential standard of review 
to Treasury Department regulations than we 
apply to the rules of any other agency. In the 
absence of such justification, we are not in-
clined to carve out an approach to administra-
tive review good for tax law only. To the 
contrary, we have expressly recognized the im-
portance of maintaining a uniform approach to 
judicial review of administrative action. 54 
III. What Mayo Doesn't Do 
What Mayo does is to clarify the law, as shown in 
Part II above. What Mayo doesn't do is fundamen-
tally alter the balance of power between taxpayers 
and the government in cases in which the validity 
of Treasury regulations is challenged. Any fear on 
the part of taxpayers that tax regulations will now 
be effectively immune from challenge would be 
exaggeration on the order of Chicken Little's "the 
sky is falling!" 
I say this for three reasons. First, holding that 
Chevron applies to challenges to general authority 
tax regulations isn't revolutionary - the clear trend 
of the law was already in that direction. In his dissent 
in the Tax Court's 2006 Swallows Holding decision, 
Judge Mark V. Holmes tabulated the circuits. He 
found that six circuits applied Chevron in cases in-
volving general authority regulations, that five cir-
51 Steve R. Johnson, "lntem101mtain and the Importance of 
Administrative Law in Tax Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 23, 2010, p. 
837, Doc 2010-15990, 2010 TNT 163-4. 
52E.g., Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your 
Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers," 13 Va. Tax Rev. 517 (1994); 
Kristin E. Hickman, "The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Excep-
tionalism in Judicial Deference," 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006). 
53See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713-714 (citing Mead; Chevron; Brand 
X; Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990); and Long Island Care at 
Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)). 
54Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (punctuation omitted). In support of 
this proposition, the Court quoted one nontax case, Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999), and cited another nontax case, 
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989). 
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cuits rejected Chevron in that context, and that two 
circuits had no clear position on the issue.ss Since 
then, two circuits (the Third Circuit in Swallows Hold-
ing and the Eighth Circuit in Mayo) moved from the 
National Muffler camp into the Chevron camp, and 
one circuit (the Second Circuit) that previously took 
no side in the controversy seemed to be edging to-
ward Chevron. 56 Moreover, the Tax Court - which 
had been a principal holdout against the trend -
hedged its bets by stating in several cases that it need 
not choose between National Muffler and Chevron to 
decide the case at hand.57 The Tax Court also applied 
Chevron in cases involving general authority regu-
lations when compelled to do so by the Go/sen rule.58 
In short, Mayo merely confirmed where the law was 
headed in any event. 
Second, that a case is analyzed under Chevron is 
far from a guarantee that the agency will prevail. 
Chevron is usually considered a deferential standard 
favorable to the agency.59 However, that need not be 
the case. When a judge wants to invalidate an agency 
position, the usually preferred approach is to declare 
that the statute is unambiguous - and adverse to 
the agency's view.60 Less frequently, but still often 
enough that the possibility can't.be ignored, judges 
accept that the statute is ambiguous but find the 
agency's interpretation to be unreasonable.61 
5sswallows Holding, 126 T.C. at 180-181. 
56See Natlrel v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2010), Doc 
2010-12160, 2010 TNT 106-12. 
57E.g., Estate of Gerson v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 139, 154 
(2006), Doc 2006-21771, 2006 TNT 206-15, ajfd, 507 F.3d 435 (6th 
Cir. 2007), Doc 2007-25098, 2007 TNT 219-17. The Tax Court is 
not the only court to have used this strategy. (t has happened 
often enough "that there has now appeared the phenomenon of 
Chevron avoidance - the practice of declining to opine whether 
Chevron applies or not." Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479-2480 
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, "How 
Mead Has Muddled judicial Review of Agency Action," 58 Vand. 
L. Rt>v. 1443, 1464 (2005). 
58E.g., Mannella, 132 T.C. at 201; Feller v. Commissioner, 135 
T.C. No. 25, at *6 (2010), Doc 2010-24040, 2010 TNT 216-16; see 
Go/sen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) (holding that the Tax 
Court will apply the law of the circuit to which the case is 
apRealable), a.ff d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). 
59See, e.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political 
Ltmguage 1md the Political Process 582 (4th ed. 2005) (calling 
Chevron a "super-deferential approach"). 
"
0E.g., Antonin Scalia, "judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law," 1989 Duke L./. 511, 520-521; Mark 
Seidenfeld, "A Syncopated Clievron: Emphasizing Reasoned 
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Stat-
utes," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-95 (1994); Note, "'How Clear Is Clear' 
in Clrevron's Step One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 1691-1692 (2lXl5). 
61 E.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); North-
point Teclz. Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.Jd 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Abbott 
Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 819 (1991). A recent illustration is the dissent in 
Mannella, which would have held a regulation under section 
6015 to be invalid at Chevron's step two. Mannella, 2011 WL 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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Perhaps America's greatest contribution to phi-
losophy is pragmatism. Despite the shift from the 
common law to statutes and regulations as the prin-
cipal instruments of lawmaking, the single most im-
portant word in the Anglo-American legal tradition 
remains "reasonableness." Judges steeped in the tra-
dition will usually find doctrinally palatable ways to 
uphold regulations they find reasonable and to 
strike down regulations they find unreasonable. 62 
There is ample play in Chevron's doctrinal joints 
to allow invalidation of overreaching tax regula-
tions. Mayo does not change that. 
Third, correctly understood, National Muffler was 
a weak reed for taxpayers fo rely on. Chief Justice 
Roberts accepted that National Muffler is a less 
deferential standard than Chevron.6.1 In this, he was 
buying a notion that has been peddled in recent 
years by lawyers and judges looking for ways to 
justify invalidating particular regulations. How-
ever, both the chief justice and the purveyors of this 
notion are wrong. Properly understood, National 
Muffler is a deferential case. 
I make here as to Mayo an argument similar to 
that I made in criticizing the Tax Court's (later 
reversed) Swallows Holding decision.64 The part of 
National Muffler that some have latched onto is its 
listing of six considerations: 
A regulation may have particular force if [1] it 
is a substantially contemporaneous construc-
tion of the statute by those presumed to have 
been aware of congressional intent. If the 
regulation dates from a later period, [2] the 
manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. 
Other relevant considerations are [3] the 
length of time the regulation has been in effect, 
[4] the reliance placed on it, [5] the consistency 
of the Commissioner's interpretation, and [6] 
the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to 
the regulation during subsequent reenact-
ments of the statute.65 
149379 at "'10-"'13 (Ambro, J., dissenting). In addition, in the 
Dominion Resources case cited supra note 13, the Court of Federal 
Claims came "very close" to invalidating a tax regulation at 
Chevron's step two. 107 AFTR2d 2011-1033, at"' 20. 
62Indeed, the whole of Chevron boils down to reasonableness. 
A regulation contrary to an unambiguous statute is per se 
unreasonable. Thus, any regulation that would be invalidated at 
step one also would be invalidated at step two. Chtrvron can 
therefore be condensed to the simpler formulation that "admin-
istrative regulations issued pursuant to authority delegated by 
Congress must be upheld unless unreasonable." Ltmtz, 607 F.3d 
at 481. 
63Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-713. 
64Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows Holding as It ls: The Distortion 
of National Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351, Doc 
2006-13093, 2006 TNT 142-37. 
6."'National Muffli•r, 440 U.S. at 477 (numbers added). 
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What the Mayo taxpayers (and other taxpayers) 
said was: "Aha! One or several of those six consid-
erations is absent as to the regulation here at issue. i 
Therefore, National Muffler dictates that this regula- '-' 
tion receive little or no deference." Mayo rejected 
this argument. The Court disposed of several of the 
above considerations as arguments against the 
regulation: 
• "We have repeatedly held that agency incon-
sistency is not a basis for declining to analyze 
the agency's interpretation under the Chevron 
framework. "66 
• "We have instructed that neither the antiquity 
nor the contemporaneity with a statute is a 
condition of a regulation's validity."67 
• "We have found it immaterial to our analysis 
that a regulation was prompted by litiga-
tion."68 
The type of argument used by the Mayo tax-
payers ignores context and distorts National Muffler. 
I offer three points in that regard. First, National 
Muffler was not a solitary event. It was one of a line 
of pre-Chevron, tax-specific cases, and that line was 
deferential in nature.69 
Second, the spirit of Nationql Muffler itself was 
deferential. In the opinion in that case, the six 
considerations were bracketed by deferential lan-
guage. They are preceded by the Court's acknowl-
edgement that Congress delegated to Treasury, not l 
to the courts, the authority to prescribe needful 
rules and that Treasury regulations should be up-
held if they implement the statute "in some reason-
able manner."70 The considerations are succeeded 
by the Court's injunction: "The choice among rea-
sonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not 
the courts."71 So bracketed, it would be myopic to 
see the six National Muffler factors as hostile to 
regulatory flexibility. 
66Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting 
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981, and citing United States v. Eurodif S.A., 
129 S. Ct. 878, 887 (2009)). Indeed, Chevron itself involved an 
agency (the Environmental Protection Agency) cha,nging its 
previous position. For discussion of other aspects of Treasury 
and IRS inconsistency, see Steve R. Johnson, "An IRS Duty of 
Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a 
Prof,osed Statutory Solution," 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (2010). 
7Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting 
Smiley v. Citibank (Soutlr Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996)). 
The regulation at issue in Chevron was not contemporaneous 
with the statute under which it was promulgated. 
68Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712 (punctuation omitted) (quoting 
Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741, and citing United Dominion Industries Inc. 
v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001)). 
69See, e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 
169 (1981); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); 
Correll, 389 U.S. 299. ~ 
70National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 476-477 (citing many cases). . 
71 Id. at 488. · 
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Third, it is worth remembering what actually 
,happened in Nntionnl Muffler. The Court upheld the 
·'regulation being challenged in that case. Moreover, 
it upheld the regulation even though it lacked 
contemporaneity, one of the six listed consid-
erations.72 
Tn sum, the Mayo taxpayers attempted to turn 
Nat irmnl Muffler on its he<1d. National Muffler was a 
deferential case in a deferential line of cases. ln that 
light, the six considerations should be viewed as 
shields to protect tax regulations, not swords with 
whid\ to attack them. That is, National Muffler 
should be read as saying tha t when one or more of 
the six considerations are present, the regulation is 
entitled to even more than usual deference - not 
that when one or more are absent, the regulation is 
due less deference. The six are plus factors, not 
negative factors. 
This reading of National Muffler is supported by 
the deferen tial context of the case. It also is sup-
ported by the language the Court used to introduce 
the six considerations: "A regulation may have 
particular force if .... " Tha t is positive language, 
not negative language. 
The positive view of the six National Muffler 
considerations also is supported by their derivation. 
The six were not inventions. Justice Harry A. Black-
mun, writing for the Court, offered them as a 
distillation of previous cases of the pre-Chevron, 
tax-specific line. Following the distillation, Justice 
Black.mun cited7'.I two cases of the line: South Texas 
L11111ber74 and Wimnill.75 Both of these cases were 
deferential in nature, both upheld the regulations 
being challenged, and both used considerations 
among the six to reach that result.76 
In seeing the six considerations as positive, not 
negative, factors, I read what the Court did in Nn-
tionrli Muffler as similar to what it did in Dixon, an-
other pre-Chevron tax-specific case.77 [n Dixon, the 
taxpayer contended that the [RS abused its discre-
tion when it gave retroactive effect to its withdrawal 
of an acquiescence to a prior case. ln part, the tax-
payer relied on Automobile Club of Micf1igan, in which 
the Court had upheld another retroactive IRS ac-
72/rl. at -185. 
73 /d. at 477. 
7
''Cmnmissio11er v. South Texas Lu111/1er Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 
( 1948). 
75Wi11111il/, 305 U.S. at 133. 
71
'5imilarly, courts deciding deference questions in nontax 
contexts often have treated Natio1111/ M1!ffeer-li ke consideratil•ns 
as positive factors. E.g., Coe11r Alaska, 129 S. Ct. <ti 2479 (Scalia, J ., 
concurring) (using lhe consistency of agency practice as a 
positive factor in upholding the agency's position in an e11vi-
ro11me11tal law case). 
n Di:ro11 11. U11iterl Sin/cs, 381 U.S. 68 ( 1965). 
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tion.78 The taxpayer argued that considerations men-
tioned in A11/omobile Club were not present in Dixon, 
and therefore Dixon should be decided adversely to 
the JRS. The Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
Although we mentioned certain facts in sup-
port of our conclusion in Automobile Club that 
there had not been an abuse of discretion in 
that case, it does not follow that the absence of 
one or more of these facts in another case 
wherein a ruling or regulation is npplied retro-
actively establishes an abuse of discretion.79 
The considerations mentioned in National Muffler 
should be understood as positive factors, not nega-
tive factors, just as Dixon understood that the con-
siderations mentioned in Automobile Club were 
positive, not negative, factors. The attempt by the 
Mayo taxpayers to apply the National Muffler con-
siderations negatively was a misuse of National 
Muffler. 
Jn this respect, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for 
the Mayo Court threw the baby out with the bath 
water. The misuse of N11lionnl Muffler by taxpayers 
(and by some judges, sud1 as the Tax Court majority 
in Swallows Holdint10) had to be stopped, and Mayo 
accomplished that end. The better wny lo have 
stopped it, however, wou Id have been to explain that 
National Muffler is actually a defcrentiaJ case, not to 
have accepted that Natio11nl M11Jfler is non-
deferentiaJ and then suggest that it is no longer good 
law. 
Put another w<1y, the destination reached was 
good but the choice of roads was not. One may 
hope that futu re cases will rehabilitate National 
Muffler based on a better understanding of it. 
To su mmarize Part TU: (1) the clear trend before 
Mnyo was to recognize that Chevron applies to 
genera l authority tax regulations (at least those that 
have gone through the APA notice and comment 
process); (2) application of Cltevron does not guar-
antee that a challenged regulation will be upheld; 
and (3) properly understood, National Muffler was 
not a pro-taxpayer stand <1 rd, so its denigration by 
Mnyo was a small loss to taxpayers. 
By emphasizing Chevron, Mayo changes the vo-
cabulary in which taxpayer challenges to tax regu-
lation must be couched. Mayo does not, however, 
fundamentally a lter the litig<1ting balance between 
taxpayers and the government. 
7HA11tm110/Jile C/1111 <f Mic/1ix1111 v. Co111111issim1t:r, 353 U.S. 180 
(1957). 
7'>oixo11, 3Hl U.S. at 76. 
MOSee Swallows l/oltli11x. 126 T.C. at 137-138. 
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IV. Future Battlegrounds 
Questions about the appropriate standards to 
apply to challenges to the validity of Treasury 
regulations existed long before Mayo,81 and al-
though Mayo answers some questions, other ques-
tions will continue and indeed might be brought 
more to the fore as a result of Mayo. Five such topics 
are addressed below: (1) regulations promulgated 
without notice and comment, (2) textually nuanced 
delegations, (3) explanation of regulatory choices, 
(4) Chevron and sub-regulation authorities, and (5) 
the future of Chevron. 
A. Regulations Without Notice and Comment 
Post-Chevron cases make it clear that Chevron 
does not apply to all cases in which agency posi-
tions are challenged.82 In concluding that the regu-
lation at issue is Chevron-qualified,83 Mayo noted 
that the regulation had gone through the notice and 
comment process, which has often been identified 
by the Court as an important factor as to whether 
Chevron applies.84 
Treasury usually submits regulations for notice 
and comment, and when it doesn't, one or another 
of the APA exceptions85 sometimes applies. But not 
always. There are times when Treasury promul-
gates regulations without notice and comment even 
when no statutory exception applies. 86 
Mayo does not cover this situation, and the stakes 
the situation raises are higher than merely which of 
several standards of deference may apply - failure 
to follow the APA when required means that the 
regulation is invalid.s7 
81 For discussion of the law up to 2004, see Irving Salem et al., 
"ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial 
Deference," Tax Notes, Sept. 13, 2lXl4, p. 1231, Doc 2004-17659, or 
2004 TNT 178-26. 
82£.g., Mead Cor11., 389 U.S. 299. 
s.1Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714. 
s-1£.g., Lo11x ls/a11d Care al Home Ltd. v. Cokt•, 551 U.S. at 
173-174; Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-231. 
s.i;For example, notice and comment is not required when the 
regulation is merely interpretive, not binding, 5 U.S.C. section 
553(b)(A), or "when the agency finds for good cause (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons 
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure 
thereon arc impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest." 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B). 
86See Kristin E. Hickman, "Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance With Administra-
tive Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements," 82 N.D. L. Rev. 
1727 (2CX>7); Hickman, "A Problem of Remedy: Responding to 
Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure 
Act Rulemaking Requirements," 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rt'V. 1153 
(2008). 
87 An unfortunate aspect of Cl1evnm and subsequent cases is 
sloppy use of the term "deference." Clrt'Vro11 issues can arise in 
two very different contexts: (1) whether a purportedly binding 
regulation makt..>s valid, enforceable law, or (2) whether a 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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Some prior cases acknowledged awareness of the 
issue but did not resolve it.88 lntermountain, recently 
decided by the Tax Court and on appeal to the D.C. 
Circuit, presents the issue via the concurring opin-
ion of judges James S. Halpern and Holmes, which 
found the regulation invalid for failure to follow the 
notice and comment requirements.89 I have written 
in support of the Halpern-Holmes position,90 and 
future cases are likely to pose this issue as well.91 
The validity of regulations promulgated outside the 
APA will be a post-Mayo battleground. 
8. Textually Nuanced Delegations 
When an old tree falls in a forest, sunlight 
penetrates to nurture new growth. Mayo disposed 
of the traditional notion that general authority 
regulations receive less deference than specific au-
thority regulations. What I propose take its place is 
greater attention to the precise terms of the delega-
tion set out by Congress in the statute - whether 
specific or general - under which the regulation at 
issue was promulgated. 
As I described in some detail in a previous 
report92 and will develop in greater detail in a 
future one, Congress frames its delegations to Trea-
sury in very different ways in different sections of 
the code. Some sections authorize Treasury only to 
fill interstices93; others allow Treasury to write new, 
major rules94; and yet others permit Treasury to 
suspend or alter substantive rules set out in the 
statute itself.95 
Under the maya of the now-discarded traditional 
notion, courts in the past too often focused on 
whether the regulation was general authority or 
specific authority in nature, to the neglect of the 
particular language of the delegation at issue in the 
nonbinding administrative position should be seen as persua-
sive. Strictly speaking, "deference" should pertain only to the 
second of these contexts, but it has been applied to both. 
88E.g., Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 348 F.~d 136, 
145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-23580, 2003 TNT 211.:B, cert. 
de11ied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004); America11 Standard Inc. v. U11ilcd States, 
602 F.2d 256, 267-269 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
89Jntermou11tai11, 134 T.C. at 222-223. 
90Johnson, supra note 51. For additional discussion of l11tt'r-
mountai11, see Note," Administrative Law," 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1066 
(2011). 
91 Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the controversy 
involved in lntermountai11. The Seventh Circuit held for the IRS 
on statutory grounds. That court offered its view that tht.> 
regulation at issue is valid. However, its remarks in this regard 
were dicta, and the court did not address the APA issue. Beard, 
2011 WL 222249, at "'7. 
92Johnson, supra note 51, at 850-852. 
93E.g., section 911(c)(2)(B). 
94Sections 1502 and 2704(b)(4). 
95sections 508(c)(2) and 4261 (e)(3)(C). 
TAX NOTES, March 28, 2011 
l 
l 
, 
, 
case. Mayo clears the way for more textually nu-
anced interpretation of delegations for tax regula-
1 tions. 
Indeed, Mayo instructs that "the ultimate question 
is whether Congress would have intended, and ex-
pected, courts to treat the regulation as within, or 
outside, its delegation to the agency of gap-filling 
authority."96 A prime source through which to de-
termine whether that intention exists is the language 
of the statute containing the delegation.97 I hope 
post-Mayo cases will more fully explore textually 
nuanced interpretation of delegations for tax regu-
lations. 
C. Explanation of Regulatory Choices 
As maintained in Part II, Mayo makes untenable 
the parochial notion that tax law stands apart from 
administrative law generally. The numerous doc-
trines of administrative law are fair game in con-
tests about the validity of tax regulations. 
A recent case, Mannella,98 raises one of those 
doctrines: the obligation of an agency to explain the 
choices it makes in constructing binding rules. 
Some previous tax cases had noted, but usually not 
resolved, those issues.99 The appearance of the issue 
in Mannella may prompt taxpayers' counsel to raise 
it more often in future cases - especially because 
the distorted National Muffler argument is no longer 
available.100 
Mannella is one of the cases testing the validity of 
the Treasury regulation imposing a time limit on 
claims for relief under section 6015(f). Reversing the 
Tax Court, the Third Circuit in Mannella upheld the 
validity of the regulation. In a dissent, Judge Thomas 
L. Ambro said that he would have held the regula-
tion invalid because, in promulgating it, Treasury 
had "not advanced any reasoning for its decision to 
impose [the] limitations period on taxpayers seeking 
96Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714 (punctuation omitted) (quoting Long 
Island Care, 551 U.S. at 173). 
97
"Congress' intent is best determined by looking to the 
statutory language that it chooses." United States v. Monsanto, 
491 U.S. 600, 610 (1989) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Sedima 
S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985)). 
98Mannella, 631 F.3d 115, was decided by the Third Circuit on 
January 19, 2011 - eight days after Mayo. 
99E.g., American Standard Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 
268-269 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Georgia Fed. Bank F.S.B. v. Commissioner, 98 
T.C. 105, 110 (1992). 
J0°Even before Mannella, commentary had urged greater use 
of the "inadequate explanation" argument. Patrick J. Smith, 
"Mayo and Clzenery: Too Much of a Shift in Rationale?" Tax 
Notes, Oct. 25, 2010, p. 454, Doc 2010-21077, 2010 TNT 207-12; 
Smith, "Omissions From Gross Income and the Chenery Rule," 
Tax Notes, Aug. 16, 2010, p. 763, Doc 2010-16074, 2010TNT158-3. 
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relief under subsection (f), leaving us no basis to 
conduct the analysis mandated by Chevron Step 
Two."Hn 
Judge Ambro invoked the Supreme Court's de-
cision in State Farm, an important nontax adminis-
trative law case.102 However, these are deep waters 
doctrinally, historically, and as a matter of policy. 
Doctrinally, State Farm is part of the broader topic of 
"hard look" review of agency decisions. Both the 
hard-look doctrine in general and the explanation 
requirement in particular have been subject to vary-
ing degrees of rigor in judicial application. State 
Farm exemplifies a strong form of the rules, but 
other decisions have been looser in approach. to3 
Historically, State Farm has been refined by sev-
eral subsequent decisions, including the Supreme 
Court's 2009 Fox decision. u14 The government 
thinks that one of those decisions - the Supreme 
Court's 2002 Verizon decision10s - vitiates the "fail-
ure to explain" argument in the section 6015 con-
text. In a brief filed on January 26 in a pending Sixth 
Circuit case, the Department of Justice argued that 
State Farm applies only when an agency is changing 
its course, not when it is "taking a position in the 
first instance." Thus, in OOJ's view, "Judge Am-
bro's criticism is ... completely misconceived."106 
I doubt that Verizon is the stake through the heart 
of Judge Ambro's contention. The Verizon Court was 
discussing State Farm in connection with whether the 
agency's choice is rationally connected to the pur-
pose of the statute, which is different from whether 
the agency must explain why it made the choices it 
did.107 Moreover, although State Farm did entail an 
agency change of position, many other explanation 
and hard-look cases involved initial agency posi-
tions, not changed positions. 10H Thus, I think the 
government will have to formulate a better response 
to the "failure to explain" argument. 
As a matter of policy, hard-look review has been 
very controversial.109 One aspect of the debate is the 
101 Mannella, 631 F.3d at 127. 
102td. (quoting Motor Vt~hicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)); see also Adamo Wrecking Co. 
v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 289 n.5 (1978). 
'°3For discussion of shifting tides in hard look review, see 
Richard J. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law 81-86 (2008); Note, 
"Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact," 122 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1909, 1910-1914 (2009). 
'°4FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
'°5Verizon Commu11icatio11s Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002). 
106Brief of Appellant, Hall v. Commissioner, No. 10-2628, at 58 
(6th Cir. Filed Jan. 26, 2011). 
w7Verizon, 535 U.S. at 502 n.20. 
108£.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402; SEC v. Cl1enery Corp., 318 
U.S. 80 (1943), later opinion, 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
109see, e.g., Thomas j. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, "The Real 
World of Arbitrariness Review," 75 LJ. Clli. L. Rev. 761, 762 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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"ossification" question: whether hard-look review, 
or the specter of it, makes issuing regulations more 
time consuming and expensive, perhaps even fore-
stalling desirable regulations entirely. 110 Scholars 
are divided about these and other putative benefits 
and burdens of hard-look review. 111 
That debate could, of course, occur in the tax 
context. Tax regulations entail numerous choices 
among numerous alternatives. Judge Ambro's Man-
nella dissent did not define the scope of the expla-
nation requirement that he would impose on 
Treasury. Depending on that definition, some might 
argue that the costs of explanation would exceed its 
benefits. 
This issue also surfaced in Dominion Resources, in 
which the Court of Federal Claims upheld a regu-
lation under section 263A. The court accepted that 
the duty of explanation applies to tax regulations. 
The court remarked: "it is a stretch to conclude that 
Treasury cogently explained why it has exercised its 
discretion [as it did in the regulation]."112 Despite 
the fact that Treasury's explanation of the key 
choices lacked "analytical precision" and were 
"even confusing,"113 the court found the explana-
tion adequate because Treasury did provide some 
explanation, Treasury responded to the remarks of 
commentators, and "the path that Treasury was 
taking in the rulemaking proceedings can be dis-
cerned, albeit somwhat murkily."114 
I have offered tentative views about Judge Am-
bro's argument elsewhere,115 and I will address it at 
(2008); see also Peter L. Strauss, "Overseers or 'the Deciders' -
The Courts in Administrative Law," 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (2008) 
(res~<mding to Miles and Sunstein). 
0Srt•, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, "The Courts and the 
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Pmfessor Seiden-
feld," 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, "Demystifying 
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial 
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking," 77 Tt•x. L. Rc•v. 
483 (1997). 
111St>t', '"K·• Jim Rossi, "Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard 
Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the 
Electric Utility Industry," 1994 Wis. L. Rt"lJ. 763; Rossi, "Antitrust 
Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review of State Regu-
latory Inaction," 93 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 225 (2001) (calling the 
Chem•ry explanation principle a "foundation of administrative 
law, frequently serving as a basis for agency reversal"); Seiden-
feld, "Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking," 87 Come/IL. Rev. 486 (2002); Peter 
L. Strauss, "Revisiting Ovt•rton Park: Political and judicial Con-
trols Over Administrative Action Affecting the Community," 39 
UCLA L. Rev. 1251 (1992). 
112107 AFTR2d para. 2011-1033, at .. 22 (punctuation omitted) 
(quoting State Fum1, s11pm, 463 U.S. at 48). 
113107 AFTR2d para. 2011-1033, at *22. 
114ld. (punctuation omitted) (quoting State Fann, supra, 463 
U.S. at 43). 
115steve R. Johnson, "Do Treasury and the IRS Have to 
Explain Their Choices?" ABA Section of Taxation NcwsQuartt•r/y, 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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greater length in a future article. The point now 
simply is that arguments like "failure to explain" 
and other staples of administrative law discourse 
will arise with increasing frequency in tax cases in 
the post-Mayo environment. 
D. Chevron and Sub-Regulation Authorities 
Mayo and the other recent cases involve chal-
lenges to Treasury regulations. Will we see more 
litigation in the future about whether Chevron def-
erence attaches to IRS pronouncements of a lower 
level of dignity than regulations, such as revenue 
rulings, revenue procedures, notices, announce-
ments, and the like?116 
There has already been much discussion about 
this question.117 The preponderance of cases and 
commentary suggests that sub-regulation adminis-
trative tax authorities typically should receive def-
erence under the more probing Skidmore standard 118 
rather than under Chevron. 11 9 
As one who often prefers bright lines to mushy 
facts and circumstances approaches,120 I would be 
happy to see this view attain settled status. But that 
might not be the case. First, despite Justice Antonin 
Scalia's urging, the Supreme Court has resisted 
drawing a bright Chevron line.121 For example, the 
Court has stated that the use of the notice and 
comment procedure, although often a good indica-
tor of Chevron qualification, is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for applying Che11ron.122 
Spring 2011, at 11; "Johnson: More on Mannella," TaxProf Blog, 
Jan. 25, 2011, available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/ 
taxrirof_blog/2011 /01 /johnson.html. 
16For description of the types of administrative authorities 
in tax, see David M. Richardson et al., Civil Tax Procedure 16-2.1 
(2d ed. 2008). 
117£.g., Kristin E. Hickman, "lRB Guidance: The No Man's 
Land of Tax Code Interpretation," 2009 Miclr. St. L. Rev. 239. 
118Sidmort• v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (listing as 
factors "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade"); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (listing 
"the merit of [the] writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertise, its 
fit with interpretations, and any other sources of weight"). 
119E.g., Aeroquip-Vickers Inc. v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173 (6th 
Cir. 2003), Doc 200.l-22794, 200.l TNT 203-11; Omolrwrdro v. 
United States, 3<Xl F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002), Doc 2002-19316, 
2002 TNT 162-20; Salem et al., supra note 81, at 744-750. But set• 
Ryan Lirette, "Giving Cl1evro11 Deference to Revenue Rulings 
and Procedures," Tax Notes, Dec. 20, 2010, p. 1357, Doc 2010-
24589, or 2010 TNT 245-7. 
120See, e.g., the judicial "cry from the heart" about problem-
atic facts and circumstances determinations in Biedenlzam Realtt1 
Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 414-415 (5th Cir. 1976). · 
121Compare Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003-1004 (Breyer, J., concur-
rin~kto id. at 1014-1019 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
E.K., Barnlrart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
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Second, Treasury and the IRS sometimes omit no-
tice and comment for regulations but sometimes 
.1 employ it for sub-regulation pronouncements.1i.1 
In short, the waters are muddy enough that the 
application of Chevron to sub-regulation authorities 
may grow as an aspect of controversy in the post-
Mayo world. Indeed, the ink was barely dry on 
Mayo when a circuit court case reminded us that 
notice and comment is not invariably required for 
an administrative position to claim Chevron entitle-
ment.t24 
E. Future of Chevron 
I've saved the broadest of the future issues for 
last. Now that tax regulations have been brought 
unambiguously within its domain, what may be the 
future of Chevron? 
It is ironic that after waiting more than a quarter 
of a century, the Supreme Court unanimously ap-
plied Chevron to tax regulations after a rising chorus 
has proclaimed that Chevron has failed. Judge Am-
bro's dissent125 cites Prof. Jack M. Beerman's article 
"End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How 
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be 
Overruled. " 126 
Beerman is far from alone. Many other commen-
tators (both tax127 and nontax) have suggested that 
Chevron has failed, either empirically (because it is 
at best haphazardly applied)128 or normatively (for 
many reasons, including that Chevron is contrary to 
the APA and that it lacks an adequate theoretical 
foundation).1 29 But, of course, there isn't uniformity 
of view as to Chevron's success or lack of it. Chevron 
still has defenders.130 
123For example, in 2010 the IRS developed a new schedule, 
Schedule UTP, to be attached to the returns of business tax-
payers to disclose uncertain tax positions taken on their returns. 
In doing so, the IRS used the notice and comment process. See 
Announcement 2010-75, 2010-41 IRB 428, Doc 2010-20922, 2010 
TNT 186-26, and Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 IRB 408, Doc 
2010-1882, 2010 TNT 17-14. 
124Beard, 2011WL222249, at *7. 
i2..r;Mannella, 631 F.3d at 127, n.14. 
12642 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (2010). 
127 As one example in tax, Pmf. Bryan Camp does not conceal 
his distaste for Chevron. Camp, supra note 4, at 507 ("Everybody 
starts with Chevron. What a crock."). 
128E.g., Ann Graham, "Searching for Clrevron in Muddy 
Watters," 60 Admin. L. Rev. 230 (2008); Linda Jellum, "Chevron's 
Demise: A Survey of Chevron Fmm Infancy to Senescence," 59 
Admin. L. Rev. 725 (2007); Note, "Justifying the Clievron Doctrine: 
lnsi~ts Fmm the Rule of Lenity," 123 Harv. L. Rev. 2043 (2010). 
1 9E.g., William R. Anderson, "Against Chevron: A Modest 
Pmposal," 56 Admin. L. Rev. 957 (2004); Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
"Clievron's Mistake," 58 Duke L./. 549 (2009); John E. Duffly, 
"Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review," 77 Tex. L. 
Rev. 113, 189-211 (1998); Elizabeth V. Foote, "Statutory Interpre-
tation or Public Administration: How Clievron Misconceives the 
Function of Agencies and Why It Matters," 59 Admin. L. Rev. 673 
(2007). 
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I share the opinion of Chevron's critics. Chevron is 
the most widely discussed principle of administra-
tive law.131 Yet it is, in a sense, an accidental 
doctrine - the Court did not appreciate when it 
decided Chevron that the case would attain the 
significance it has.132 Perhaps the Court would have 
thought more carefully about the underpinnings 
and consequences of its opinion had it had that 
foresight. In any event, both because of its original 
weakness and because of its massaging by sub-
sequent cases, the skein of Chevron is now so knotty 
that its untanglement may be impossible. 
This does not cause me to lament Mayo. Until the 
Supreme Court abrogates Chevron, tax should be 
subject to Chevron no less than any other area of law 
is. The weaknesses of Chevron argue for the case's 
overthrow or reform generally rather than serving 
as an excuse for tax exceptionalism. 
Despite the trenchant criticisms of Chevron, I 
doubt that the Supreme Court will accept Beer-
man's invitation to overrule it. The unanimity of 
Mayo suggests that the Court is in no such mood. 
Nonetheless, as identified in Part Il above, signifi-
cant questions remain as to the nature of the inquir-
ies to be made under the Chevron framework. The 
practical and theoretical problems with Chevron will 
affect the resolution of those questions. In light of 
Mayo, we in the tax community have a vital interest 
in that resolution, and we cannot remain indifferent 
to the larger debates about Chevron and its future. 
V. Conclusion 
Mayo is a welcome decision. It settles several 
important questions that had lingered too long. I 
doubt that Mayo will change the outcomes of many 
litigated cases, but it will allow us to arrive at the 
right answers with less wasted motion. Standing on 
the platform of Mayo, we can now reach toward 
resolution of other issues as to the validity of 
Treasury regulations. 
130For survey of some of the commentary, see Evan J. 
Criddle, "Clievron's Consensus," 88 B.U.L. Rev. 1271 (2008). 
131 See, e.g., Stephen C. l)reyer et al., Administrative lAw 1md 
Regulatory Policy 247 (6th ed. 2006). 
132See Thomas W. Merrill, "The Story of Clievron: The Making 
of an Accidental Landmark," in Administrative lAw Stories 398 
(Peter L. Strauss, ed. 2006). 
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